## Message Text

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FOR SS ONLY

FOR ATHERTON FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, MARR, SA

SUBJECT: ARMS FOR SAUDI ARABIA

REF JIDDA 6513

SUMMARY: SAUDI FONMIN PRINCE SA'UD, SPEAKING ON BEHALF OF MINDEF SULTAN

ASKED AMBASSADOR NOV 6 WHEN SULTAN COULD EXPECT REPLY TO HIS LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 17. AMBASSADOR RECOMMENDS THAT HE BE AUTHORIZED TO

INFORM

SULTAN THAT SOME MISUNDERSTANDINGS EXIST ABOUT SECRETARY'S STATEMENTS ON DELIVERIES, SOME OF SULTAN'S TARGET DATES WOULD NOT BE MET, AND TO GIVE HIM WRITTEN STATEMENT OF LATEST DELIVERY SCHEDULES.

AMBASSADOR BELIEVES APPROACH BY HIMSELF BEST WAY OF CONTAINING DAMAGE,

ALTHOUGH ALTERNATIVELY, AFTER AMBASSADOR'S DEPARTURE FROM POST, A HIGH LEVEL GROUP COULD MAKE SIMILAR PRESENTATION. SULTAN LIKELY IN ANY

CASE TO MAKE RENEWED APPEAL DIRECTLY TO SECRETARY KISSINGER. END SUMMARY

1. SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER PRINCE SAUD TOLD ME THIS AFTERNOON THAT DEFENSE MINISTER PRINCE SULTAN, KNOWING SAUD WAS TO SEE ME, ASKED HIM TO ASK ME WHEN WE COULD EXPECT A REPLY TO HIS MESSAGE OF SEPTEMBER 17. I TOLD SECRET

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HIM WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED A REPLY. SAUD COULD NOT

UNDERSTAND THIS AS THE SECRETARY HAD SAID BOTH HERE AND IN THE STATES THAT SAUDI ARABIA MILITARY WOULD BE GIVEN TREATEMTN EQUAL TO THAT GIVEN OUR OWN FORCES; THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ALSO SAID REPEATEDLY THAT HE WAS THE ONLY ONE WHO COULD CUT THROUGH PENTAGON RED TAPE AND SHOULD THERE BE ANY FURTHER PROBLEMS ON ARMS DELIVERIES THE SAUDIS SHOULD TURN DIRECTLY TO HIM. HE SAID NOW THAT KISSINGER WAS MORE FIRMLY IN CONTROL HE COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THERE WOULD BE FURTHER DELAYS.

- 2. I WROTE TO YOU ON THE SUBJECT ON NOV 1 BUT GIVEN THE VAGARIES OF POUCH SERVICE, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE A RESUME HERE
- 3. I NOW BELIEVE THAT THE BEST WAY OF CONTAINING THE DAMAGE ARISING FROM THE SECRETARY'S SEPT 2 VISIT CAN BEST BE HANDLED BY INSTRUCTING ME TO SEE SULTAN TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:
- A) THERE SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN SERIOUS MISUNDERSTANDINGS ABOUT WHAT SECRETARY KISSINGER SAID ABOUT ARMS DELIVERIES:
- B) THE SECRETARY WAS PRESSED FOR TIME AND WAS NOT FAMILIAR WITH THE SUBJECT; THE SAUDIS WILL HAVE NOTED THAT HE DID NOT EVEN KNOW WHAT SOME OF THE MILITARY SYMBOLS MEANT;
- C) BECAUSE OF OTHER COMMITMENTS AND LONG DELAYS IN FACTORY PRODUCTION, SOME OF SULTAN'S TARGET DATES WOULD NOT RPT NOT BE MET:
- D) I WOULD THEN READ HIM A PAPER CLEARED BY ALL PERTINENT U.S. GROUPS SETTING OUT THE DELIVERY SCHEDULES ON ALL ITEMS AND LEAVE HIM A COPY.
- 4. SULTAN WOULD CERTAINLY BE UNHAPPY. HE WOULD CERTAINLY REFER TO THE SECRETARY'S ASSURANCES, AS DID SAUD, AND MIGHT CONCLUDE THERE HAD BEEN DELIBERATE DECEIT ON OUR PART.

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TM SULTAN WILL THEN ALMOST CERTAINLY WRITE DIRECTLY
TO THE SECRETARY AND ASK HIM TO INTERCEDE ON SAUDI
ARABIA'S BEHALF. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE SECRETARY
THEN REPLY HE HAD DONE EVERYTHING HE COULD BUT THE
DELAYS WERE PHYSICAL REPEAT PHYSICAL NOT POLITICAL AND THAT HE WOULD
CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR PRIORITY TREATMENT FOR SAUDI
ARABIA.

- 6. WHILE THERE COULD BE MERIT IN HAVING A HIGH-LEVEL GROUP COME TO SAUDI ARABIA AFTER I LEAVE, I BELIEVE IF IT WERE TO HAVE ANY MEASURE OF SUCCESS IT WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW THE PROCEDURE I HAVE OUTLINED IN PARA 3 ABOVE. I CERTAINLY COULD NOT GUARANTEE SUCCESS BUT, I BELIEVE I WOULD BE, IN FACT, MORE SUCCESSFUL THAN ANY HIGH-LEVEL GROUP WE SHOULD SEND OUT. AND IN ANY CASE, IF I FALL FLAT ON MY FACE YOU COULD ALWAYS HOLD THE HLG IN RESERVE.
- 7. WHATEVER IS DECIDED ACCEPTANCE OF MY SUGGESTED APPROACH OR SOME VARIATION THEREOF IN SENDING A HIGH-LEVEL GROUP I HOPE THE DECISION COULD BE TAKEN SOON. AKINS

NOTE BY OC/T: CAPTION 'FOR SS ONLY' ADDED PER S/S-O - MS. MATTESON.

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